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Recently, the problem of secure position-verification has been extensively analyzed in a formal 
notion where distant verifiers send encrypted challenge along with the decryption information to 
the prover. However, currently it is known that all the existing position-verification scheme are 
insecure and secure positioning is impossible [Nature 479, 307-308 (2011)]. We propose here a 
different notion for position-verification where distant verifiers determine the actions of the 
prover through non-local correlations generated by local measurements at the provers’ site. The 
proposed scheme guarantees secure positioning even if the verifiers do not have any pre-shared 
data with the prover; position is the only credential of the prover. Our proposed scheme is secure 
in general and evades known quantum attacks based on instantaneous non-local computations in 
particular. The scheme enables verifiers to identify dishonest provers with very high probability
n2/11−≥ρ , where n is the number of entangled pairs used.  
 
Introduction 
In a general position-verification scheme, a prover located at a specified position convinces a set 
of verifiers at distant reference stations that he/she is indeed at the specific position. In a formal 
notion of position-verification, different verifiers send a secret message and a key to decrypt that 
message in pieces to the prover. That is, each verifier sends a bit of key such that all the key bits 
and the message arrive at the position of the prover concurrently. If the prover decrypts the 
message correctly and sends the result to all verifiers in time, position-verification scheme 
enables the verifiers to verify his position jointly. But if one or a set of dishonest provers, not at 
the specified position, intercept the communication and try to convince verifiers that they are at 
the specified position, a secure position-verification scheme enables the verifiers to reject it with 
high probability.  
An unconditionally secure position-verification is impossible in classical cryptography 
where classical data can be copied [1]. A large number of quantum position-verification schemes 
[2-8] have also been proposed but unfortunately all these schemes are proved to be insecure later. 
Currently it is known that if the position of the prover is his/her only credential and he/she does 
not have any pre-shared data with the verifiers, then unconditional position-verification is 
impossible [8,9]. The security of any quantum position-verification (QPV) scheme can be 
destroyed by coalition of dishonest provers through teleporting quantum states back and forth 
and performing instantaneous non-local quantum computation, an idea introduced by Vaidman 
[10]. S. Beigi and R. Konig showed that if dishonest provers posses an exponential (in n) amount 
of entanglement then they can successfully attack any QPV scheme where n qubits are 
communicated [11]. Burrman et al have also shown that the minimum amount of entanglement 
needed to perform a successful attack on QPV schemes must be at least linear in the number of 
communicated qubits [9,12].  
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In the search of unconditional security, some authors proposed that secure positioning is 
possible if the prover and the verifiers pre-share some classical or quantum data. Kent proposed 
that secure quantum position-verification is possible if the prover and one of the verifiers pre-
share some classical bit string unknown to eavesdroppers [13]. This secret data can then be used 
as a secret key to authenticate the communication. Recently, we have also shown that key-based 
quantum position verification can be securely achieved if distant verifiers and the prover pre-
share entangled states [14]. The verifiers and the prover obtain secret keys through entanglement 
swapping [15] and then use these keys for authentication of secret messages.   
Recently, we showed that combination of causality and quantum non-locality promises 
fascinating advancement in getting unconditional security from dishonest users [16,17]. For 
example quantum commitment scheme [16] and general framework for relativistic quantum 
cryptography [17] that implements important tasks such as oblivious transfer, two-sided two-
party secure computation, and ideal coin tossing and unconditionally secure bit commitment. 
We propose here a scheme for secure positioning based on causality and quantum non-
locality. The distant verifiers neither send a secret key to the prover for decrypting the challenge 
nor do they have any pre-shared data with the prover. The verifiers determine the actions of the 
prover through non-local correlations generated by local Bell measurements from a specific 
position. Teleportation [18] is used to insure that any group of dishonest provers, not at the 
position to be verified, cannot simulate their actions with the prover who is supposed to be at the 
specified position. Proposed scheme guarantees secure positioning by bounding the prover to 
receive, measure (in publically known basis) and teleport quantum information simultaneously as 
do the verifiers.  
 
Teleportation 
Teleportation is the most important step in our proposed scheme for secure positioning. In 
general teleportation works as follows: Suppose Alice and Bob share a maximally entangled 
state in Bell basis 
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where }1,0{, ∈ba and ⊕  denotes addition with mod 2. Bob can send an arbitrary quantum state 
10 βαψ +=
 
to Alice instantly by performing Bell state measurement [19] (BSM) on ψ  and 
his half b
 
of entangled pair. If Bob gets classical 2-bit string bb ′ , Alice’s entangled half a  
instantly becomes one of the four possibilities: 
                                                            ψσσψ kxkz ′=′                                                                (2) 
where k  and k′  depend on the Bell state ab
 
shared between them. For example, if they share a 
Bell state 00  then bk =  and bk ′=′ . If shared Bell state is 01
 
then bk =  and bk ′⊕=′ 1 . If 
they share Bell state 10
 
then bk ⊕=1 and bk ′=′  while for 11 , bk ⊕=1 and bk ′⊕=′ 1 . If Bob 
sends two classical bits bb ′  to Alice, she can easily recover ψ  by applying suitable unitary 
operators. However, without knowing shared entangled state ab
 
or BSM result bb ′  of Bob, 
ψ ′
 remains totally random to Alice and we use this fact in our scheme for secure positioning. 
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Quantum scheme for secure positioning 
We assume that the sites of the prover and reference stations are secure from adversary; enabling 
them to store and hide the quantum data and process. We also assume that the verifiers can 
communicate both classical and quantum information securely with each other. However, all the 
quantum/classical channels between verifier(s) and the prover are insecure. Moreover, there is no 
bound on storage, computing, receiving and transmitting powers of dishonest provers. They can 
interfere or jam communication of the prover without being detected. In short, dishonest provers 
have full control of environment except position of the prover and reference stations.  
All reference stations and the prover have fixed positions in Minkowski space-time. Both 
quantum and classical signals can be sent between prover and verifiers at the speed of light while 
the time for information processing at position of the prover and reference stations is negligible. 
For simplicity, we discuss our scheme for two verifiers V1 and V2 at distant reference stations 
collinear with prover P, such that the prover is at a distance x from both reference stations. 
Explicit procedure of our quantum scheme for secure positioning is described below where both 
verifiers and the prover measure and send quantum states in publically known Hadamard basis.
 
 
1). At time t=0, verifiers V1 and V2 secretly prepare EPR pairs 1111 PV HHpv ⊗∈ and 
2222 PV HHpv ⊗∈  respectively and each sends second half to P.  
2). At time t=x/c, V1 teleports state ±=ψ
 
to P. As a result V1 gets classical information 
}11,10,01,00{∈′vv
 while the P’s half 1p  becomes ψσσψ kxkz ′=′  where values of  k  and k′  
depend on vv ′  and 11pv  only known to V1. 
3). At the same time t=x/c, P measure 1p
 
in agreed Hadamard basis and teleports ψ ′
 
to V2 
over EPR channel 22 pv . Entangled half  2v  in possession of V2 becomes ψσσψ ′=′′
′l
x
l
z  
where values of l  and l′  depend on P’s BSM result }11,10,01,00{∈′pp  and 22 pv . 
Simultaneously, P sends classical 2-bit string pp ′  and quantum state  ψ ′  to both V1 and V2.    
4). At time t=2x/c, verifier V2 verifies that whether ψ ′
 
and ψ ′′  are consistent with BSM result 
pp ′ of P or not. Similarly V1 validates whether ψ
 
and ψ ′
 
are consistent with his BSM result 
vv ′  or not. If both V1 and V2 receive verified information from P, they exchange their 
measurement outcomes somewhere in their causal future and verify the position of P if P has 
replied within allocated time; at t=2x/c. 
In the proposed scheme, classical communication between the prover and verifiers can be 
reduced to single bit only. Since ±=ψ , Pauli encodings  },{ xlxlz I σσσ ∈′
 
give same outcome 
ψ ′′
 
at V2 site up to overall phase factor. Similarly, },{ xzzlxlz σσσσσ ∈′
 
give same outcome ψ ′′ . 
For example, if { }01,0022 ∈pv  , then P’s BSM result }01,00{∈′pp  will result in 
},{ xlxlz I σσσ ∈′
 
while that of }11,10{∈′pp  will generate },{ xzz
l
x
l
z σσσσσ ∈
′
. Hence, instead of 
sending classical 2-bit string pp ′  to verifiers, prover can simply announce that whether first bit 
of his BSM result pp ′ is 0=p  or 1=p . In short, if the verifiers run this scheme with
n
V CH
⊗
= )( 2
1
,
n
V CH
⊗
= )( 2
2
 and nnPPP CCHHH ⊗⊗ ⊗=⊗= )()( 2221 , the proposed scheme 
enables them to identify dishonest provers with very high probability; n2/11−≥ρ . 
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Figure 1: Quantum scheme for secure positioning: Solid arrows represent quantum states; dotted 
arrows show teleportation from V1 to P and P to V2 respectively while dashed arrows show 
classical information from P to the verifiers.   
 
Security analysis 
In [8,9,11,12], it was shown that no position-verification scheme can evade quantum attacks 
based on instantaneous non-local quantum computations by dishonest provers. For example, the 
impossibility proof discussed by Buhrman et al are applicable to the QPV schemes where the 
prover P receives a quantum system 
1PH  from the verifier V1 and a system 2PH  from V2; 1PH  
and 
2PH are components of some larger quantum system 2121 VVPP HHHHH ⊗⊗⊗= . The 
prover then applies some unitary transformations U  on 
21 PPP HHH ⊗=  depending on the 
classical information V1 and V2 obtained from V1 and V2 respectively. In this existing notion, the 
verifiers validate the exact position of the prover P if he replies correct information )( PHU , 
consistent with V1 and V2 and hence larger quantum system H , within allocated time.  
Such position-verification schemes are not secure since a group of dishonest provers P1 
and P2 at different positions from that of P can obtain both quantum ( 1PH  and 2PH ) and classical 
information (V1 and V2) before the prover P. Hence they can reply exact information )( PHU  to 
the verifiers within time by performing non-local instantaneous computations. As a result, 
verifiers cannot differentiate between the responses from the prover P and group of dishonest 
provers at positions different from that of P.  
Here we show that our proposed scheme is secure against such entanglement-based 
attacks: verifiers neither send qubit-wise encrypted quantum systems as a challenge nor classical 
information for decrypting that challenge. Instead, verifiers determine the actions of the prover 
through non-local correlations generated by local measurements from a specific position. The 
verifiers starts the scheme at t=0 by preparing quantum system 
2211 PVPV HHH ⊗= where 
1111 PVPV HHH ⊗=  is a maximally entangled system shared between V1 and P while V2 and P 
share entangled system 
2222 PVPV HHH ⊗= at time t=x/c. Verifiers control the space time position 
where they want to reveal the challenge through teleportation. Before that space time position 
(occupied by prover P), dishonest provers cannot extract required information from quantum 
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systems 
1PH  and 2PH in the causal past of prover P since these quantum systems do not contain 
information required for position-verification. 
Suppose dishonest prover P1 is between V1 and P at position (x-δ,0) while P2 is between 
V2 and P at position (x+δ,0) respectively. Now P1 can intercept 1PH  and get entangled with the 
verifier V1 in a state 11PVH  while P2 shares entangled state 22 PVH  with verifier V2 at time t=(x-
δ)/c.   
In our proposed scheme, prover P (or dishonest provers) has to reply with both quantum 
state ψ ′
 
and classical 2-bit string pp ′  simultaneously. In other words, P (or dishonest provers) 
has to receive teleported state ψ ′
 
from V1 and then teleport same state ψ ′
 
to V2. Since verifier 
V1 knows the definite state ψσσψ kxkz ′=′ from initially prepared EPR pair 11pv  and his BSM 
result vv ′ , hence verifiers V1 and V2 can verify that whether the announced BSM result from 
prover P (or dishonest provers) is consistent with ψσσψ ′=′′ ′lxlz
 
or not.  
Moreover, verifier V1 teleports quantum state ψ
 
over EPR pair 11pv  not before time 
t=x/c, hence specially separated dishonest provers P1 and P2 are restricted to perform only 
following non-local computation during time interval {(x-δ)/c,x/c}: P1 (P2) performs 
entanglement swapping on 11pv  ( 22 pv ) and pre-shared entangled state 21pp  with P2 (P1) 
such that only P2 (P1) is entangled with both verifiers V1 and V2. In that case P1 (or P2) can send 
both quantum state and classical BSM result to both V1 and V2 but not before t=(2x+δ)/c.  
Even if P1 and P2 have infinite amount of pre-shared entanglement and perform non-local 
instantaneous computations through multiple rounds of teleportation [10], P1 and P2 can agree on 
ψσσψ kxkz ′=′
 
and required classical 2-bit string only at time t=(x+2δ)/c and hence can send 
required information to both V1 and V2 not before time t=(2x+δ)/c.    
 
 
Figure 2: Quantum scheme for secure positioning with dishonest provers P1 and P2. 
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Discussion 
We proposed here a different notion for secure positioning where distant verifiers do not send a 
secret key to the prover along with challenge but the actions of the honest prover are determined 
through non-local correlations obtained by local measurements at the provers’ site. The causality 
principle insures that the proposed quantum position-verification scheme is secure against 
entanglement-based attacks even if eavesdroppers have infinite amount of pre-shared 
entanglement and power of non-local quantum measurements in negligible time.  
The proposed scheme for secure-positioning can be efficiently and reliably implemented 
using existing quantum technologies. Since the quantum memory for reliable storage of 
entangled quantum systems is not available yet, we use more practical setup where the prover 
and verifiers can store and communicate classical information only.  
The combination of causality and quantum non-locality as discussed here for secure 
positioning promises fascinating advancement in getting unconditional security from dishonest 
users. For example, the receiver can trust the information he receives only if the scheme verifies 
position of the sender and validates sender’s actions in a single round. This bounds sender to 
reveal valid information within allocated time and guarantees to the sender that the receiver will 
not be able to get information unless sender reveals.  
Hopefully, proposed scheme for secure positioning would help in achieving quantum 
cryptographic tasks that are considered to be impossible otherwise. In the broader perspective, 
this notion for secure positioning could be useful to understand relativistic quantum theory on the 
basis of quantum information science.  
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